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Comments
THE AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM:
IS "IMMUNITY" THE VITAL PROVISION?
ERIC C. EISENBRAUN
T HE FEDERAL Aviation Administration (FAA) is the agency
charged with policing the national aviation system.' In order
to effectuate this responsibility the FAA is given authority to pro-
mulgate regulations designed to improve or maintain the level of
safety in all aviation.! The FAA is also given authority to punish
violators of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).' In 1976 the
FAA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the National
Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) which established
the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).' For approximately
a year prior to this Memorandum the FAA had attempted to
operate a similar program without result.' The ASRS was initiated
and sponsored in part by the FAA but independently managed by
NASA." Reporters to ASRS were given a promise of immunity
from disciplinary action for violations of Federal Aviation Regu-
lations and a promise of complete anonymity.' After three years,
on May 16, 1979, FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond, in a
speech to the National Aviation Club, made public his plan to
modify the ASRS.8 The proposed modification was to eliminate
149 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1348, 1655(c)(1) (1976).
'Id. at 5 1348(c).
'Id. at 1471 (Supp. 1980), 1655(c)(1).
441 Fed. Reg. 15,915 (1976).
'40 Fed. Reg. 17,775 (1975).
'Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Ad., Aviation Safety Reporting System Fact
Sheet.
7Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65 (April
1979).
8 Originally established as the Aviation Safety Reporting Program, 40 Fed.
Reg. 17,775 (1975), and first modified on April 15, 1976 to become the Aviation
Safety Reporting System, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,914 (1976). ASRS is a project set up
to identify safety related problems that are in any manner related to aviation.
Observers of safety incidents report directly to ASRS which is managed by NASA
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what Bond called the "blanket immunity" provision of ASRS.' This
so-called "blanket immunity" provision had been the subject of dis-
agreement between the FAA and the aviation community"0 since
April of 1976.1 The FAA believed that because of the immunity
provision in ASRS, FAA enforcement responsibilities could not be
performed adequately." The reaction to Bond's proposal was in-
stant and unfavorable."3 As a result of this reaction, Bond modified
his proposed change in an apparent compromise with the aviation
community and the Congressional Subcommittee responsible for
overseeing the FAA." The purpose of this comment is to plot the
life of the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the purposes behind
its establishment, and its growth. Finally, the atmosphere sur-
rounding the debate over the immunity provision is examined end-
ing with an analysis of the present system and its future.
I. HISTORY OF THE AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
A. The Aviation Safety Reporting Program
The Aviation Safety Reporting Program (Program), forerunner
of the ASRS, was established on April 22, 1975.' One of the
under the authority of the FAA. The reports are analyzed and conclusions drawn
therefrom are used to make corrections and prevent future safety problems
from arising. ASRS applies to that part of the national aviation system involv-
ing the safety of aircraft operations, including departure, enroute, approach and
landing operations and procedures, Air Traffic Control deficiencies, pilot/controller
communications, the aircraft movement area of an airport, and near midair
collisions. Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46A (1976).
Address by Langhorne Bond, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration,
to the National Aviation Club (March 16, 1979).
9 id.
10 See generally Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting Sys-
tem: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transporta-
tion, House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979-
1980) (statement of John H. Winant) (president, Nat'l Bus. Aircraft Assoc.).
1141 Fed. Reg. 15,915 (1976). On April 15, 1976, ASRS was instituted with
a provision for what in actuality was only a limited waiver of disciplinary action.
Id. 12 Address by Langhorne Bond, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, to the National Aviation Club (March 16, 1979).
13 E.g., "Removal of immunity is a blow against safety and a return to
ignorance." Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation,
House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979-1980)
(statement of John L. Baker) (president, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Assoc.).
1444 Fed. Reg. 18,128 (1979).
1540 Fed. Reg. 17,775 (1975).
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catalysts leading to the Program was the crash of Trans World
Airlines (TWA) flight 514 in the mountains of northern Virginia
on December 1, 1974 in which ninety-two people died." This
tragedy emphasized the need for a detailed study of human factors
and human performance in the aviation system." Although the
TWA crash was one of the catalysts, the idea of some sort of
program to study air safety, its causes and results, was not new.
In the early 70's, then Secretary of Transportation Claude Brine-
gan assigned a task force of senior pilots to study air safety.18 One
of the major recommendations was the establishment of an inci-
dent reporting program to evaluate the Air Traffic Control system."
Other interested groups were working on the same concerns.
Scientists, engineers and medical experts at NASA's Ames Re-
search Center had been studying the role of human factors in
aviation safety.'" The task force came to the conclusion that a pro-
vision for anonymity, and even possibly immunity, for persons
reporting safety incidents (or Federal Aviation Regulation viola-
tions) was fundamental to the success of any participative system."
The Program faced opposition and lack of aviation community
support from the very beginning." Part of the reason for this ab-
sence of support was lack of faith in the FAA's intentions.' In
the 60's and early 70's the FAA conducted a "participative, sup-
posedly cooperative study" of near midair collisions.' The aviation
community who participated in obtaining the information to be
used in the study believed that the FAA did not cooperate with
them nor share the data obtained with them in the study but in-
16 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant) (president, Nat'l Bus. Aircraft Assoc.).
17Id.
" Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65 (April,
1979).
9 Id. The Air Traffic Control System is the system having responsibility for
the safe takeoff, flight, and landing of aircraft throughout the United States.
20 Id. This group included Dr. Charles Billings who later became project
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stead manipulated or omitted the data altogether.' Because of
the similar concerns perceived by the aviation community in the
Program, most aviation organizations opposed it."
Facing the refusal of the aviation community to participate, and
recognizing the need for a safety incident reporting program, the
FAA negotiated with NASA for the involvement and the applica-
tion of the system designed by the task force at NASA-Ames."
NASA's function was as a third party intermediary-to act as an
"honest broker" for report processing and analysis of the safety
data to be derived from the voluntarily submitted reports. 8 The
FAA went to the major organizations' in the aviation community
to secure their commitment to participate, offering both immunity
and anonymity to reporters, except under specified circumstances.'
The organizations agreed to recommend that their members par-
ticipate after the FAA made some minor changes.2' This support
was deemed essential because the purpose of the program was
to collect current operating data on hazards in the national aviation
system," and the organizations are the major source of safety data
2Id.
Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Dr. James J. Kramer) (Assoc. Admin., Office of Aeronautics & Space
Technology. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Ad.); "[Clitizens were usually reluctant
to work with the cops who might punish them in reward for their cooperation."
Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65 (April 1979).
27 Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65, 66 (April
1979).
28 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Dr. James J. Kramer).
29 The following organizations all played a role: Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association; Airline Pilots Association; Aviation Consumer Action Project; Nat'l
Business Aircraft Association, Inc.; Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organi-
zation.
28 Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65, 66 (April
1979). Those "specified circumstances" were cases involving criminal offenses,
accidents, reckless operations, gross negligence, or wilful misconduct. 41 Fed. Reg.
15,903 (1976).
" Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65, 66 (April
1979). The changes were: (1) any reference to individual carriers was removed
from the data base; and (2) any reference to make and model of aircraft was
deleted. Id. at 66.
2 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
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since their members are working in the aviation business every
day. The Program, with the addition of NASA and the support
of the aviation community, became known as the Aviation Safety
Reporting System.'
B. The Aviation Safety Reporting System
The initial FAA/NASA Memorandum of Agreement (Memo-
randum) essentially provided for, (1) limited waiver of disciplin-
ary action against reporters by the FAA, (2) confidentiality of
information sources, and (3) an advisory subcommittee appointed
by NASA and consisting of representatives from all elements in-
volved in the operational aspects of the national aviation system,
including the FAA and the Department of Defense." The objective
of providing for an "honest broker" was to increase the previously
light flow of information.'
ASRS is designed to identify system and operating problems
through a large number of safety incident reports voluntarily sub-
mitted.' Taken individually, reported experiences could identify
particular deficiencies; taken cumulatively and properly organized,
the reports, it was hoped, would describe concerns that might be
endemic to the system or to operating procedures." By acting as
a central point for the collection of reports it was hoped that ASRS
would be able to detect trends and situations that would serve to
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John L. Baker).
" 41 Fed. Reg. 17,775 (1976).
1'41 Fed. Reg. 15,915 (1976). The agreement between the FAA and NASA
was entered into under the authority of Sections 302(K) and 313 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, (49 U.S.C. S 278(a) (1976)) and the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2473
(1976)). The advisory subcommittee is charged with advising on a continuous
basis and with insuring the security and confidentiality of the guarantee it makes
to reporters. The FAA/NASA Memorandum also gives the subcommittee the re-
sponsibility for conducting two intensive evaluations of all aspects of the system's
performance, utility and effectiveness. 41 Fed. Reg. 15,915 (1976). Both reports
have been made and are referred to in other portions of this comment. See notes
67, 69, 142, 148, 155, 161, 176, 178 infra.
'Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46A (1976).
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alert the aviation system to developing problems before those
problems cause accidents. 8
The provision for limited immunity was designed to provide the
same set of conditions which exist in a physician's or attorney's
office.39 Previous experience under an FAA Near Midair Collision
Reporting program indicated that the willingness of persons to
submit a report depended significantly on the FAA's ability to
preserve the anonymity of those filing the report." The purpose,
then, of the waiver of disciplinary action (immunity) was twofold.
First, the waiver was to provide an incentive to encourage the
timely, voluntary reporting of safety information.' Second, the
waiver was to enhance the program's concept of confidentiality."2
To support the concept of confidentiality the Memorandum pro-
vided for transactional immunity with regard to information con-
tained in ASRS reports.'
Upon receipt of a safety report NASA screens it initially for in-
formation relating to any criminal offense or aircraft accident."
If the report contains information relating to a criminal offense or
an accident it is immediately forwarded, without further processing,
to the Justice Department or the National Transportation Safety
Board, respectively, with a copy sent to the FAA." These are the
n Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad., Aviation Safety Reporting System Fact
Sheet.
"Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant).
40 Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46 (1975).
41 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Dr. James J. Kramer).
4 2 Id.
I Id. Transactional immunity means that if any report is submitted by any-
one involved in a safety incident or FAR violation all persons involved in that
incident are immune from FAA disciplinary action.
"Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad., Aviation Safety Reporting System Fact
Sheet, 2. This screening is done by either a qualified attorney with aviation
experience or pilot employed by NASA. Id.
' An example of a criminal offense would be "a violation of the Federal
Statutes, Title 18, U.S. Code. Hijacking, smuggling and sabotage are such viola-
tions." Id. Aircraft accidents are described in the Code of Federal Regulations as
accidents involving midair collisions, flight control system malfunction or failure,
fatal or serious injury, substantial damage, etc. 49 C.F.R. § 830 (1980).
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only instances when a report leaves NASA's possession with the
identity of the reporter revealed."
Concurrently with the information screening process, NASA
examines all reports to catch any situation or condition that poses
an "immediate, urgent threat to aviation safety.""" NASA does not
screen safety reports for violations of the Federal Aviation Regu-
lations.' After this initial processing the report is assigned to a
report analyst for further processing. If after examining a report
the analyst has reason to believe that further details would en-
hance the value of the report as a safety document, or if clarifica-
tion is required, the analyst attempts to contact the reporter by
telephone." When the analyst decides that a particular report is
as complete as necessary, or when further information is unavail-
able, he "deidentifies" that report by removing the identification
strip0 and obliterates any other information in the body of the
report that might identify the reporter. 1 The deidentified report is
prepared next for computer entry, and once entered into the com-
puter the original is filed and is destroyed in 45 days." The ASRS
computer is searched periodically and automatically to spot trends
in the increasing body of processed reports."
Under ASRS, as set up by the original Memorandum between
NASA and the FAA, in order for the waiver of disciplinary action
to apply, a written report had to be completed and delivered to
NASA within 5 days of the incident, or written notification pro-
vided to NASA within 5 days and a complete written report filed
46 Id.
47 Id. If such a situation or condition is suspected, the report is given to a
report analyst for priority handling. Id.
48 Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad., Aviation Safety Reporting System Fact
Sheet, 2.
49 Approximately 16% of the reports received require callbacks and approxi-
mately 70% of those reporters are actually reached. Callback, ASRS Monthly
Bulletin, no. 5 (November, 1979).
50 The identification strip is a detachable portion of the form used in re-
porting. The strip is necessary to facilitate callbacks if further information is
needed. This strip is returned to the reporter as proof that he submitted a report.
Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad., Aviation Safety Reporting System Fact Sheet,
3.
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within 15 days?' If a timely report had been filed, FAA disciplinary
action was waived against everyone who might have been involved
in the incident.' The procedure for the waiver was as follows:
the FAA had a period of 45 days following an incident to ask
NASA whether a report had been fied regarding that incident.
Except in specified circumstances" the waiver applied if the FAA
did not make the request within the 45 days or if the FAA dis-
covered that a report was, in fact, timely filed."
When ASRS was established, the non-punitive, limited immunity
provision was judged by the FAA, the aviation community, and
ASRS management as "an absolutely critical incentive" for the
submission of voluntary reports." The provision was seen as pro-
viding the basis for (1) absolute candor in the descriptive details
furnished by the reports; (2) a capability to describe the actions of
persons other than the reporter without making those other per-
sons subject to an FAA enforcement action; and (3) encourage-
ment of persons in "borderline" situations to make full reports
without fear of involvement in enforcement proceedings."
The tangible product of ASRS took three forms: (1) special
studies of the data base; (2) quarterly reports; and (3) alert
bulletins." Alert bulletins were the most responsive products of
the system. Strict conditions were followed in making the deci-
" Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46A, 3 (1976).
"Id. at 2.
"See note 30 supra. Cases involving accidents or criminal offenses were
wholly excluded from the program. Reports involving reckless operation, wilful
misconduct, or gross negligence were not to be used by the FAA for disciplinary
purposes but disciplinary action could be taken in these cases on the basis of
information independently obtained by the FAA. Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad.,
Advisory Circular no. 00-46A, 3 (1976).
' Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46A, 2 (1976).
58 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant). Further support for this conclusion can be inferred
from the fact that the FAA adopted the conclusion of the NASA task force (see
note 21 supra) that anonymity and immunity were fundamentals to ASRS success.
59 Id.
"Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65, 67 (April
1979). Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad., Aviation Safety Reporting System Fact
Sheet, 4-5. These materials are generally available to the public on request by
writing to: Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, P.O. Box 189,
Moffet Field, Cal. 94035.
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sion regarding whether an alert bulletin was to be issued. The
reports were required to be credible; risk of an accident where
negligence wasn't a factor, such as a physical, regulatory, pro-
cedural, or operational hazard was required; and a technologically
feasible solution (in the judgment of the analysts) had to exist."1
Outside the FAA, ASRS as set up April 15, 1976 was supported
unanimously and was seen as effective at reaching its intended
goals."' In connection with the advisory subcommittee final evalua-
tion!3 of June, 1979, various elements of the aviation community
and the FAA were queried whether they believed that the program
resulted in any safety benefits." While the FAA's responses were
largely negative, the aviation community identified significant
benefits of a specific or conceptual nature."
[ASRS] was designed and operated from 1976 to 1979 in ways
which encouraged and fostered a high degree of utility. ASRS has
impressively well met the fundamental utility objective spelled out
for it: 'to increase the flow of information' on safety related inci-
dents and occurrences in the national aviation system .... In all
cases the findings are that ASRS has, through performance judged
as being from adequate to outstanding, met desired or contem-
plated utility criteria."
The waiver/immunity provision was given much of the credit for
"' Id. In 1979, alert bulletins: stimulated the re-surfacing of a runway at a
major airport that was reported to ASRS as dangerously slick in wet weather;
caused chart revisions of obsolete or incorrect information; was responsible for
improved runway and taxiway markings; pointed out some navaid and com-
munication abnormalities; noted ambiguous or confusing aural identifiers and
intersection names; and called attention to garbled ATIS broadcasts.
Callback, ASRS Monthly Bulletin no. 1, 2 (July 1979).
"See Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979-1980) (state-




Report on ASRS Utility and Eflectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm., 5-6 (June
29, 1979). In all fairness to Mr. Bond it should be noted that this report was
not finished and issued until approximately 3 months after he announced his
proposed modification. On the other hand there was some discussion as to the
reasons behind Mr. Bond not delaying his decision until after all the facts were in
and the final report made.
1980]
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the success of the program." The ASRS reports, in actuality, were
what was hoped for conceptually in the establishment of the sys-
tem; they were "plain truth recitations" of what the reporters per-
ceived to be discrepancies and deficiencies in the national aviation
system." The emphasis in the reports was heavily on human factor
and human performance occurrences." The number of reports
submitted also support the conclusion that the system was indeed
working even better than planned."0 The very large total of re-
ports sent in was seen as proof that the system provided a strong
incentive for persons to report on discrepancies and deficiencies in
the aviation system." The ultimate conclusion drawn by the avia-
tion community was stated by John Leyden, President of the Pro-
fessional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization. "The program has
worked more effectively than any of its predecessors in producing
comprehensive and candid reports of hazards in the airspace
system."t
C. The Proposed Modification
It was against this background' that Langhorne Bond, FAA
67Letter from John H. Winant to Langhorne Bond (March 15, 1979).
Largely because of the waiver, ASRS received 16,000 reports
in less than three years. More important, over 11,000 of these
reports have involved human errors in the aviation system ...
ASRS studies have demonstrated the nature of several system
problems which were causing human errors in the air and on the
ground .... Immunity" . . . is the most important incentive which
has produced this body of available and usable information.
Id.
48 Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm., 6 (June
29, 1979).
:0 70% of the reports were on these subjects. Id. The data reported to ASRS
was also tested for relevance to aviation safety and was found to bear an
extremely high degree of relevance-97%. Id. at 10.
70 Tripp, Air Safty's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65, 67 (April
1979). The data base had been building at a rate of more than 5,000 reports
per year as opposed to the 2,000 per year anticipated by the system's designers.
Id.
71 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant).
72 Id. at 5 (statement of John F. Leyden) (president, Prof. Air Traffic Con-
trollers' Org.).
" While the above statements were all made after Bond's proposal, the sys-
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Administrator, made his proposal to drop unilaterally, the "blanket
immunity" provision from the Memorandum with NASA." "Under
[the] modifications, airmen will no longer be able to claim im-
munity for violations-witnessed by others-of safety regula-
tions."' Bond's initial proposed modification was intended to elimi-
nate the waiver of disciplinary action completely while preserving
the anonymity provision." This would allow disciplinary action
to be taken when a violation was reported by a source other than
ASRS." In other words, the essence of the proposed modification
left NASA's role as it was under the original Memorandum."
Under the proposed modification, whether or not a report had
been filed would be irrelevant for purposes of FAA enforcement
action."
This proposed modification does not appear as drastic as the
response seems to indicate; however, there is more to the effect of
the proposal than is apparent at first glance. Playing a large role
in the controversy is the view of the FAA held by the aviation
community. One concern was that the aviation community would
not, because of suspicion of the FAA, understand that the proposed
modification left the anonymity provisions of ASRS intact." Cap-
tern was the same before the proposal, an evaluation was due in 3 months and
all the above information was readily available.
"Address by Langhorne Bond, Administrator, Fed. Av. Ad., to the Na-
tional Aviation Club (March 16, 1979). Authority to adopt and modify the
program is found in sections 305, 307(c), 313(a), 601(a), 701(a) and 1104 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1348(c), 1353(a), 1354(a),
1421(a) and 1504 (1976)) and section 6(c) of the Dept. of Transportation Act(49 U.S.C. § 1655(c) (1976)).
7'Address by Langhorne Bond, supra note 74.
7'44 Fed. Reg. 18,128 (1979). "It is now accepted that the NASA system
has proven that it provides anonymity. Consequently, the waiver of disciplinary
actions by FAA against persons involved in incidents reported to NASA is
unnecessary so far as reporter protection is concerned." Id.
7 Id.
78 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Langhorne Bond).
" Id.
80 While your proposal would withdraw immunity and still preserve
anonymity (so that enforcement actions cannot be initiated because
of an ASRS report), and while the FAA may diligently attempt
to make this distinction clear to the user community, can you afford
to assume that the average user, usually suspicious of possible
1980]
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tain John J. O'Donnell, president of the 30,000-member Air Line
Pilots Association, was one of the first to make a statement which
lends support to this concern:" "This simply means that no pilot,
no controller, . . nor any other person will provide detailed in-
formation about a situation or an incident and then have the FAA
build a case against him."8 This apparent misunderstanding still
prevailed at the congressional hearings held approximately one
month after Bond's initial proposal." In short, the credibility of
the FAA had a significant effect on the perception of Bond's pro-
posal" in the aviation community.
The Administration believed that because of the immunity pro-
vision, FAA enforcement responsibilities could not be carried out
effectively.'
It is an inescapable fact that our enforcement abilities have been
seriously compromised by the Program's blanket immunity ...
[I]f we do not retain for ourselves the flexibility to take enforce-
ment action against any and all who violate the regulations upon
FAA sanctions, will understand this distinction and continue to
report with the same frequency?
Letter from Cong. John L. Burton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Gov't Activities and
Transp., House Comm. on Gov't Operations, to Langhorne Bond (March 15,
1979).81News, Airline Pilots Assoc., no. 79.10 (April 2, 1979).
8 Id. The misunderstanding is apparent from the fact that any report to
ASRS could not be used, indeed would be unknown, by the FAA. Disciplinary
action would have to be taken on information obtained independently of ASRS.
"Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979-80).
Needless to say, controllers will be very reluctant to fully and
candidly report on an incident if by doing so they can implicate
fellow controllers or pilots. Not only would there be an impairment
of the free flow of information vital to ASRS but an atmosphere
of mutual distrust and hostility between controllers and pilots
could quickly develop.
Id. at 3 (statement of John F. Leyden).
" See text accompanying footnotes 125-30 infra.
'Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979-80). Statistics
cited by Bond showed that the FAA completed 324 enforcement actions against
air carrier pilots in 1976 and 1977 but in the same period of time 116 enforce-
ment actions could not be taken against airline pilots because of the immunity
provision. During this time, enforcement actions against air carriers and air
carrier personnel decreased by 22% despite increases in traffic levels. Id. at 9
(statement of Langhorne Bond).
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which air safety is founded, we have lost the deterrent effect that
any enforcement program must have to be effective."
The FAA also believed abuse of the immunity provision was seri-
ous enough to warrant its discontinuance."7 "Freedom from self-
incrimination is one thing and freedom from accountability is quite
another."88 Cited by Bond as an example of this abuse was "[a]t
least one air carrier [which] has gone so far as to give blank re-
porting forms to its pilots, along with the instructions to protect
themselves by filing a report whenever they think they've done
something that might even be close to a violation." '89
Bond also based his proposal on the belief that it really did not
matter if the modification caused the demise of ASRS since "the
majority of problems that are identified through the Program are
already known to us through our own information and reporting
system."'" According to Bond the FAA regional directors had
unanimously expressed the opinion that ASRS had not provided
any significant, useful data not already known."1 In addition, much
of the data received from ASRS was nearly a year old and un-
verified whereas the FAA's data was current and verifiable because
the sources were known."2 In the end, the decision to modify ASRS
clearly appears to have been the result of the FAA's own analysis
of a system the survival of which depended upon the cooperation
of all the aviation community."'
The aviation community, on the other hand, found support for
9 Id. at 8-9.
87 Id.
"Address by Langhorne Bond, Administrator, Fed. Av. Ad., to the National
Aviation Club (March 16, 1979) at 7. "We are only closing the loophole that
makes it possible for a violator to escape punishment even if the offense is
committed in full public view." Id. at 9.
9 1 Id. at 8.
90Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Langhorne Bond).
91 Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. "It has become apparent to me that providing blanket immunity to
anyone involved in an incident-an incident in which human lives could have
been jeopardized-does not promote aviation safety and, in fact, could well serve
as a roadblock to the advancement of safety." Id. at 5.
1980]
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reaching an opposite conclusion. They readily admitted that abuse
of the immunity provision took place but argued that such facts
were taken into consideration in the formation of ASRS and the
abuses were insignificant in terms of the advantages offered." Since
none of the conditions under which the program was established
had changed, there was no reason to make any major changes in
the system's basic structure.'" In a letter to Bond, Congressman
John Burton stated:
[W]e have been keenly aware that a trade-off between enforcement
and information may be inherent in [the decision to modify ASRS].
This is a serious trade-off that should be made only as a last resort,
and only to the extent that there is irrefutable evidence that avia-
tion safety is jeopardized by ASRS immunity ....
John Winant, Chairman of the ASRS Advisory Subcommittee and
president of the National Business Aircraft Association, did not
agree with Bond that enforcement effectiveness was suffering to
the extent that it had become necessary to withdraw immunity."
In fact, as Congressman Burton explained in the letter to Bond,
more than 25% of the claimed damage to enforcement effective-
ness was the result of administrative procedure rather than the
immunity provision of ASRS." In another 40% of the cases Con-
gressman Burton found either FAA equipment or procedural de-
"4Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant). "It was fully taken into account in 1975 that some
potential for abuse existed under the limited immunity provision. The record
shows .... that abuses are of insignificant proportions." Id.
"Id.
" Letter from Cong. John L. Burton to Langhorne Bond (April 9, 1979).
"'Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant). "There is no validity in the FAA's view that the system
has deterred the orderly enforcement of Federal Aviation Regulations." Id.
9 Letter from Cong. John Burton to Langhorne Bond (May 7, 1979).
Approximately 28% of the enforcement actions were halted not
because an ASRS report had been filed, but because the FAA failed
to, or could not, query the NASA data base within 45 days. In
other words, more than + of the "damage to enforcement" done by
ASRS was because of the way it was administered and not because
of limited immunity itself. As such, it can be dealt with by a minor
administrative change... Id.
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ficiencies." Another study revealed that of the 5,500 reports sent
in per year, only approximately 3% dealt with FAA enforcement
matters.' In other words, 97% of the reports dealt with matters
other than FAA violations. If the immunity provision was dropped
the total of reports might drop dramatically because reporters
would be concerned about possible enforcement action in any in-
stance where it is not clear whether a FAR violation has occurred.
The aviation community unanimously believed that "the chance
of making major breakthroughs in safety right at the frontier of
human factors analysis far outweighs an apparently small number
of abuses, none of which has involved an accident, injury, or
death."1 ' The consensus was that the concept of limited immunity
was vital to the continued success of ASRS.1°' An accurate appraisal
of the opinion of the aviation interest groups was stated by Frank
Munley: '° "Unlike Mr. Bond, I'm firmly convinced that the prob-
lem of human error is better tackled by a scientific investigation
of the true causes of hazardous situations, as opposed to a punitive
approach which ignores the intent of the violator."' "
In addition to the merits of his proposed modification, Bond
was criticized for the procedure he followed. There was concern
with Bond's disregard of the Advisory Subcommittee. He asked
99 Id. These instances were either described or cited as such by the FAA in-
spectors. Id.
'00ASRS management studied a sampling of 1/3 of the FAA queries sub-
mitted in 1978. Of the approximately 3,300 queries processed, only 175 were
"hits" (an ASRS report concerning the incident was on file). In short, less than
6% of the FAA queries matched up with an ASRS report. A detailed examina-
tion of the 175 hits revealed that 21 involved deliberate actions, certificate
problems or other alleged violations not covered by the waiver. In these 21
cases it appeared that FAA personnel were ignorant of the ground rules [because
enforcement action was not initiated despite the fact that the waiver did not
apply.] Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1979-1980)
(statement of John H. Winant). There is also the argument that even 3% is
a large margin of error when dealing with human lives, sometimes in large
numbers.
101 Id. at 17.1
*
2 Id. at 5 (statement of John F. Leyden).
11 Safety Consultant for the Aviation Consumer Action Projcet.
'0" Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Frank Munley).
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for their input in the process of his decision and then ignored
their suggestions."' A second important concern was that Bond
did not comply with the rulemaking provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.. providing for notice and comment on all
proposed rules. These criticisms dissipated when Bond, under
pressure from all interested groups except his own agency, decided
to delay implementation of his proposed modification.
D. The Compromise
On April 3, 1979 the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Government Activities and Transportation held hearings at
which Bond and the major aviation interest groups were given the
opportunity to express their views. In the letter informing Bond
of the hearings, Congressman Burton asked him to substantiate
his allegation that ASRS deterred FAA enforcement action to a
significant degree, to indicate how the FAA would assure that
ASRS would not be seriously damaged if immunity was cancelled,
and to assess the effect of the cancellation of immunity upon the
total data collection system of the FAA." ' Bond did not answer
these questions to the committee's satisfaction. and shortly after
' To me, at least, it was implicit [in the agreement between the FAA
and NASA] that the subcommittee's views would be given careful
consideration and due weight through a consultative process.
Recent events convince me that of late the FAA has not considered
the process of consultation to be pertinent.
FAA action to cancel or curtail limited immunity has been on a
unilateral, arbitrary basis. We [the Advisory Subcommittee] feel that
the element of faith on which the system was founded has been
grossly breached.
Id. at 6 (statement of John H. Winant).
10 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) provides in part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in
the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place and nature of public rule
making proceedings; . . .
10 7 Letter from Cong. John L. Burton to Langhorne Bond (March 15, 1979).
108 Letter from Cong. John L. Burton to Langhorne Bond (April 19, 1979).
For the later hearings, Bond was given 4 main topics to explain and discuss with
the Subcommittee:
1) The definition of current exemptions to immunity, and your
efforts to refine and expand those definitions to end perceived
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the first round of hearings ended, Congressman Burton, Chairman
of the Subcommittee, invited Bond back for a further round of
hearings. ' For this proposed second hearing Bond was asked to
prepare to support his position in more detail and with a more
thorough analysis.11 The second hearing was never held. On April
30, Bond met with the subcommittee staff director and proposed
that the modification be delayed until July 1 so that the FAA could
work with the ASRS Advisory Subcommittee both on the actual
terms of the modification and on the implementation of it.111
The end result of the cooperation between the ASRS Advisory
Subcommittee and the FAA was a compromise of Bond's proposal
to cancel all immunity."' The finally accepted proposal did limit
immunity somewhat but did not eliminate it as Bond proposed to
do. The mainstay of the program, the anonymity offered a reporter
making a report to ASRS, was not changed.11" If anything, this
provision was strengthened;.. however, other elements of the com-
promise modification differ from both the original Memorandum
and from Bond's proposed modification. The differences affecting
reporters under the system as it now stands are a limitation to
abuses of ASRS, and your efforts to insure a clear understanding
of limited ASRS immunity among FAA field personnel.
2) The qualitative and quantitative decrease in information, in
ASRS and in other FAA programs, which you anticipate as a
result of immunity cancellation, and the decrease which you are
prepared to accept.
3) The statistical evidence substantiating your claim that ASRS
immunity, with its current exceptions, has posed a significant
deterrent to enforcement.
4) The probable violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
by your failure to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, thus
allowing for public comment.
Id.
Id.110 Id.
"I Letter from John L. Burton to Langhorne Bond (April 30, 1979); (con-
firming the stated arrangement and canceling the proposed hearing).
11 44 Fed. Reg. 24,980 (1979).
11 See text accompanying 114, 117 inlra.
114 The anonymity provision was made a part of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions. Section 91.57 of the Federal Aviation Regulations prohibits the use of any
report submitted to NASA under ASRS (or information derived therefrom) in
any disciplinary action by the FAA, except information regarding criminal
offenses or accidents. 14 C.F.R. § 91.57 (1980).
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one waiver of disciplinary action and a shift in the burden of proof
regarding filing of a report."'
[A]Ithough a finding of a violation may be made, neither a civil
penalty nor certificate suspension will be imposed if:
(3) The person has not been found in any prior enforcement
action to have committed a violation of the ASRP of the Federal
Aviation Act or of regulation promulgated under that Act. ;11.
This portion is new and relates back to the establishment of ASRP
which was approximately one year prior to ASRS."' Subsection
(4) shifts the burden of proof to the reporter's shoulders whereas
prior to this provision all that was required was that a report have
been filed regardless of who filed it."'
Also significant is that only the reporter is immune as opposed
to anyone involved in a reported incident, the case prior to the
modification."' The modified ASRS, like its predecessor, does not
eliminate responsibility for reports, narratives, or forms presently
required by other existing non-ASRS directives."' Under the old
program the FAA would cease its investigation as soon as it was
learned that a report on the incident being investigated had been
filed. Under the new system's procedure, even if immunity is
granted, the FAA will continue its investigation and may make an
official finding that a violation has been committed.'' In short, the
FAA's enforcement responsibilities are closer to what Bond felt
they should be, yet there is still some incentive to file a report if
one is involved in a safety-related incident.
... Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46B (1979).
"a Id.
... ASRP was established in 1975 and ASRS in 1976.
"I Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46B (1979);
"(4) the person proves that, within 10 days after the violation, he or she com-
pleted and delivered or mailed a written report of the incident or occurrence
to NASA under ASRS." Id.
119 Id.
Inld.
" Yodice, The Aviation Safety Reporting Program: An Update, THE AOPA
PILOT 116, 117 (November 1979). "The FAA will not fully investigate all cases
and stop short only at the point of imposing a remedy." Id. at 117.
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II. COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE SYSTEM
A. The FAA's Position
The FAA believed that in order for it to fulfill effectively its
responsibilities to aviation safety the immunity provision of ASRS
had to be revoked."' The Administrator viewed ASRS as provid-
ing the opportunity for evasion of compliance with Federal Avia-
tion Regulations."u The atmosphere surrounding the proposed
modification was one of cracking down on violations of safety
regulations to both improve the public view of the FAA and to
punish regular FAR violators who, by filing ASRS reports, escaped
punishment."
B. The Credibility Factor
One of the main problems Bond was, and is, facing is that the
aviation community just does not trust the FAA and its motives."
In an editorial published shortly after the modification took effect
this distrust is obvious.
For the suspicious among us, the FAA's timing could not have
been worse. Langhorne Bond had just launched his get-tough
policy regarding FAA violators, [announced in the same speech
as his initial modification proposal] replete with possible fines of
up to $25,000. And the agency was steaming over an ASRS report
from NASA that refuted the FAA's projections of the near mid-
air collisions within controlled airspace."
Some of the criticism of the FAA in this area was directed towards
the FAA's allegedly self-interested use of the aviation community
and the information generated from these groups."' The thrust of
22 Address by Langhorne Bond, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administra-




125 See note 82 supra. "It is well known that [the] FAA is not now and
rarely has been held in high regard by large segments of the aviation community."
Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House Comm. on
Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979-1980) (statement of John
F. Leyden).
O20lcott, Business and Commercial Aviation 11 (July 1979).
2 7 Questioning the System, Special Report: The Fallacy of Positive Control,
THE AOPA PILOT 49 (April 1979). "It can be said that the FAA manages the
system in many ways, one of which is to manage evaluation and to channel any
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the criticism was directed at the aviation community, viewed as
the FAA's overprotective interest in protecting its own policies.
"It's no secret that ASRS may come up with findings which cast
doubt on FAA policy .... It appears that the FAA wants to seri-
ously weaken ASRS in order to eliminate any future conflicts with
FAA policy. 128 The aviation community saw Bond's action as
"a purely defensive, diversionary tactic"'29 of the FAA which tried
to shift the blame for insignificant faults in ASRS to the aviation
community by charging "that there are no problems with it [FAA]
or with [ASRS], only with those who operate it [the "abusers"].'
The FAA, however, is not the only party in this scenario that can
be seen as acting in its own best interests. Counsel for the Aircraft
Owners & Pilots Association stated that filing an ASRS report was
one way to take the "punitive aspect" out of a FAA "overreaction"
to "mistakes.".' In essence, there is evidence of a sense of distrust
and disbelief between the aviation community and the FAA.
C. The System Today
ASRS is a program that was instituted by the FAA with NASA
playing the "honest broker" role.1" The FAA made the initial
decision to waive disciplinary action against reporters." ASRS
was not the first civil aviation reporting system to contain a form
of immunity.1" From 1968 to 1971 the FAA had conducted a
system relating to the reporting of near misses between aircraft."
After about a year of operation the immunity provision of this
potential change in directions most satisfying to itself as an institution. It man-
ages the flow of information and releases what best serves its interests." Id. at 49.
12 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Frank Munley).




11 Yodice, NASA Safety Reporting Program, THE AOPA PILOT 90 (July
1977).
1'2 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
11 Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46 (1975).
13 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15 (1979-1980)
(statement of John H. Winant).
= ld.
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program was revoked, report volume fell dramatically and the
system was abandoned because the input became so insignificant
that no useful results were forthcoming." There were other pro-
grams which also were not very successful, and it was believed
one of the reasons for their ineffectiveness and short life was that
the quality and the quantity of reports diminished due to a lack
of protection afforded the reporter and those he reported on."'
Partially for this reason the designers of ASRS believed a limited
immunity provision was critical to the success of the program. 3'
Apparently in confirmation of that belief, report volume jumped
approximately tenfold with the inception of the NASA program."9
"Dispelled by creation of ASRS were animosities, distrusts, and
misunderstandings which had largely prevented the parties from
totally unified and open action to enhance aviation safety, par-
ticularly in the human factors area."' "
ASRS is a unique system that appears to have commanded
respect from those who operate and work with it on a day-to-day
basis. In the words of Dr. James Kramer, Associate Administrator,
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NASA:
[W]e know of no other such system, voluntary or mandatory,
that offers (and delivers) the complete standard of confidentiality
and anonymity promised by the ASRS program. An indication of
the importance of confidentiality is provided by the fact that 70%
of the reports in the ASRS database contain statements revealing
human error information; it is not unusual for reporters to reveal
their own operational mistakes for the ASRS database when they
won't even tell others about the occurrence, let alone why it
happened.' 4'
The Advisory Subcommittee, in its 1979 evaluation of the sys-
tem recognized the importance and utility of this aspect of the
system."' The highest potential utility of the system is its ability
' Id. at 1-2.
1' Id. (statement of John F. Leyden).
1i d.
1"9 Id.
:40 Id. at 3 (statement of John H. Winant).
"'Id. (statement of Dr. James J. Kramer).
'4' Report on ASRS Utility and Eflectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm. (June 29,
1979). "Since such kinds of data do not derive from any other aviation report-
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to spot misperceptions and misunderstandings by the operators and
users of the aviation system. " This ability to identify possible
problem areas goes to the heart of explaining the mystery of
human error.'" That this information is available to a much wider
group of people and more quickly than any other safety-oriented
program, is seen as a major strength of the program. '" Some be-
lieve the fact that the government agency responsible for the pro-
gram cannot withhold, manipulate, or otherwise control the in-
formation received and disseminated is equally, if not more, im-
portant.' Regarding the confidentiality/immunity provisions, there
has not been a breach in the over 17,000 reports received so far. "
This fact alone is capable of engendering confidence in ASRS in
potential reporters. It could also be indicative of the seriousness
attached to the possible results of ASRS input.
The Advisory Subcommittee on ASRS admitted in its 1979
evaluation that "ASRS has not yet been the cause of significant
changes in the organizational elements of the national aviation
system... ."'" In the same breath, the subcommittee acknowledged
ASRS as "an important, proven source of tangible and intangible
benefits related to safety in the system."" Some of those benefits are
felt in ways that may not have been foreseen. For instance, sev-
eral airline companies believe ASRS information has been valuable
in the management of their training programs.' In addition,
ing system, their collective effectiveness is judged as singularly unique, innova-
tive, and far reaching in impact." Id. at 6.
143Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of John H. Winant).
144 Id.
3 Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65 (April
1979).
1" Id. at 67.
4' Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46B (1979).
'4" Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm. (June 29,
1979).
14 Id.
150 Letter from Cong. John L. Burton to Langhorne Bond (April 9, 1979).
ASRS has proven valuable beyond just helping airline training programs. Ex-
amples of the value of the system are many, but the two following are indicative.
One dark, moonless night a pilot operating his craft under VFR (visual flight
1980] COMMENTS
Congressman Burton, Chairman of the congressional committee
charged with the oversight of ASRS, took the position that the
system was too valuable to risk destroying its efficiency and effec-
tiveness by making changes that could only adversely effect the
input.15'
There are flaws and problems in the system. However, aside
from the inevitable, occasional abuse of the immunity provision,
these problems are minor and mainly administrative. Initially,
there is a problem in communicating the information received to
members of the aviation community who could benefit from re-
ceiving it."' This problem perhaps reflects the small operating
budget of NASA or that NASA is research, rather than communi-
rules) learned a frightening lesson which he shared with NASA in an ASRS
report. He had called into the Las Vegas approach control over Boulder City at
5,000 feet seeking clearance into the Traffic Control Area. He was given clear-
ance direct to the Las Vegas airport and told to descend to 3,500 feet at his own
discretion. After he passed over the mountains, he descended to 3,500 feet and
was given a radar vector to 340 degrees. He then became concerned about ter-
rain clearance and requested the minimum safe altitude at least 3 times before
he was advised that it was 4,800 feet. This was obviously quite dismaying to
the pilot. After he successfully negotiated the unfavorable terrain and landed,
he was informed that terrain clearance was his responsibility when flying VFR
even if operating under radar vectors in a Traffic Control Area. As it turned
out, his was the second report where vectors and an assigned altitude of 3,500
feet had taken pilots into areas where terrain clearance was not assured. NASA
advised the FAA which changed procedures at Las Vegas to prevent the danger
from arising again. Yodice, Aviation Safety Reporting Program Modified, THm
AOPA PILOT 133 (June 1979).
A somewhat similar incident also led to corrective action at the Tucson, Ari-
zona, airport. A pilot departing under State III service was cleared to turn
right after takeoff to a heading of 150 degrees, maintaining at or below 3,500
feet. After takeoff, departure control assigned him a right turn to a heading of
270 degrees, maintaining at 3,500 feet. Fortunately the pilot was familiar with
the area and requested terrain separation to avoid the 3,699 foot mountain
south of the San Xavier Mission, and turned left to 240 degrees to effect his own
separation. The controller, noticing the turn, called the pilot and directed him to
turn back 300 degrees, heading him straight into the mountain. The pilot wisely
cancelled Stage III service at that point. This also unfolded as part of a pat-
tern that caused NASA to alert the FAA followed by remedial action from the
FAA. Id.
151 "This subcommittee [House Subcomm. on Government Activities and
Transportation, House Comm. on Government Operations] considers the ASRS
to be an irreplaceable system. It is the only truly independent source of
information about problems in the air traffic control system." Letter from Cong.
John L, Burton to Langhorne Bond (March 15, 1979).
'
2 Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PIoLr 65, 67 (April
1979).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cation, oriented.'" A second problem area is that participation by
potential reporters could be broader."5' This lack of participation
may be due to a pervasive fear of self-incrimination despite im-
munity and confidentiality provisions. More likely, however, it
is a concern that identification of problems will only result in
more regulation.
One of the answers to the above problems is to increase knowl-
edge about ASRS. An increase in awareness about the system, its
methods, and possible results could encourage more reporting of
incidents freely described which is invaluable to a useful end
product. The Advisory Subcommittee's 1979 evaluation found
"there is a less than satisfactory awareness of the system among
other than professional pilots and air traffic controllers.""' The
flaws existing in the system could be made less damaging by recog-
nition and administrative remedy.
D. The Future
The future of ASRS is now more promising than it would be
had Bond's initial proposal to withdraw all immunity been put into
effect. Still, the future is not clear. The Aviation Safety Reporting
System was designed to operate over an extended period of time.
It was so designed in order to identify trends that become evident
only after enough data has been reported to show a tendency is
present."' Notwithstanding the fact that both tangible and intangi-
ble benefits have been realized in its nearly four years of existence,
the advisory subcommittee saw an even brighter future in the last
'5342 U.S.C. § 2451(c) (1976).
54 Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THm AOPA PILOT 65 (April
(1979). Of more than 14,000 reports received at the time the analysis was
made, 47.5% came from pilots, 44.5% from controllers and the balance from
unidentified observers. The types of aviation represented were 43.9% air carrier,
41.2% general aviation and 11.5% military. This data looks good, but the
problem is most of the general aviation reports come from "sophisticated, pro-
fessionally flown aircraft operating IFR." Id. If a broader range of general avia-
tion operators, particularly VFR pilots and operators reported, ASRS would be
able to develop more data on weather problems, weather dissemination and
flight service stations service. Id.
15 Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm. at 14 (June
29, 1979).
"' Tripp, Air Safety's Early Warning System, THE AOPA PILOT 65, 66
(April 1979).
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evaluation in that the data base was just beginning to reach a stage
where trend identification was becoming possible."'
Despite this optimism, some of the concerns about the possible
effects of Bond's initial proposal are useful in attempting to deter-
mine the effects the compromise modification will have on ASRS.
Should the report input decrease or change character, the effect
on the system could be long-term."5 Only a high volume, high
quality system is "capable of identifying broad trends on safety
related occurrences.'.. 9 The trend spotting capability of ASRS is
seen as one of its greatest potential strengths.' " A reduction in
volume or change in character of reports could also distort the
data base if the reduction or change is the result of discouraging
the submittal of reports from certain portions of the aviation com-
munity. "This is entirely possible on the basis that immunity is of
greater concern in some areas of the system than others..'' .. Many
believed it was largely because of the waiver of disciplinary action
that ASRS received such an enormous response in its first three
years of operation."' The reports were "frank discussions of mis-
takes, whether by the reporter or others""' because the waiver
applied to all persons involved in an occurrence rather than only
the reporter himself."' On the other hand, Bond argued that "6
out of 10 incidents ...involving human error were reported by
an observer or third party" in supporting his belief that a com-
' Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm. (June 29,
1979). "[It is judged that very important benefits lie in the near term future"
• .. the Subcommittee stated in advising continuance of the program beyond
June, 1980, when the existing Memorandum of Agreement between the FAA
and NASA terminates. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,980, 24,982 (1979).
155 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Dr. James J. Kramer) (addressing the first proposed modification).
51 Id. at 15 (statement of John H. Winant).
I5 d.
'e' Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Aviation
Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm., 11 (June 29,
1979).
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plete withdrawal of immunity would not harm the system.' Evi-
dencing the stature of the FAA in the eyes of the aviation com-
munity, concern was expressed that the modification would not
only engender further mistrust of the FAA,"6 but so undermine the
credibility of future FAA administrators as to preclude user sup-
port of any safety effort by the FAA in the future.''
The most likely effect of the modification on the ASRS of the
future is a change in the character of reports because transactional
immunity no longer exists. Before an aviation operator will be
granted immunity from disciplinary action he must prove that he
has submitted an ASRS report. That a colleague submitted the
report does not now grant the individual immunity. It is reason-
able to assume, then, there will be more reports involving a partic-
ular incident. The effect of this may be to keep the number of
reports submitted up to the past levels while subtly changing the
character of those reports. This would appear to allow NASA to
reduce the number of callbacks necessary to get a better statement
of the facts. This has not yet been the case, however, and callbacks
remain at approximately 15-17% of all reports.' The effect of
this change in the character of ASRS reports could be to distort
the data base and make it necessary again to wait for a year or
two before the data is sufficient for trend identification to begin
anew.
Another effect, perhaps more serious in the long run, is that
reports may not be filed at all since the incentive of avoiding sanc-
tions may be removed. This would apply particularly to those po-
tential reporters who had violated a Federal Aviation Regulation
since the inception of the program, thereby losing their immunity
for any subsequent violation. This is precisely the type of case at
which Bond aimed his modification' and it is indeed arguable
whether someone who violated the FAR's once should be allowed
16 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979-1980) (state-
ment of Langhorne Bond).
I" id. at 2 (statement of John L. Baker).
167 Id.
10l Conversation with William Reynard, NASA-Ames.
10 See note 90 supra.
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to continue to do so with immunity assured."7 ASRS, therefore,
may not receive reports on some incidents that under the old pro-
gram would have been forthcoming.'
Another result of the modification may be increased morale and
efficiency among FAA inspectors. Under the prior system, the
investigation ended as soon as the FAA was informed a report
had been filed on the particular incident.' If an inspector was
working on a case only to find out his work would have no effect
in the end, he would naturally become frustrated. Under the
modified system a full investigation is made and the results turned
over to FAA counsel, who then determines whether to prosecute
based on an individual's failure to file a report, and whether he
had previously violated an FAR.'" The inspector knows his efforts
have not been fruitless because the least that will happen if a
violation occurs is the reporter will not be able to claim immunity
for future violations.'
III. CONCLUSION
As John Winant stated to the House Subcommittee, "[tihe deci-
sion (whether or not to revoke immunity) is not a new one. It
involves ratification of what was previously determined to be both
correct and right versus the effective termination of a unique pro-
gram which promises a high payoff in aviation safety advance-
ments."1 Because ASRS is a voluntary, confidential and non-
punitive reporting system, and because the program has been able
to strike up a dialogue with the community it serves, it has earned
a reputation for credibility and effectiveness. This effectiveness of
17O Waiver, however, has never applied and does not now apply to incidents
involving gross negligence, willful recklessness, criminal offenses, purposeful
Federal Aviation Regulation violations, or accidents.
171 This effect may be insignificant because usually more than one person will
be involved in an incident and a report will be filed by someone not relying on
the chance that another will report the incident.
1
7 2 See note 102 supra.
173 See note 171 supra; See Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad., Aviation Safety
Reporting System Fact Sheet.
174 Dept. of Transp., Fed. Av. Ad., Advisory Circular no. 00-46B (1979).
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the System, and therein its value, is due to its nature. The FAA
acts as a police force, when enforcing its regulations, seeking in
part to punish in order to encourage correct and safe operations.
This approach is punitive rather than persuasive or tutorial. Also,
it takes action only after the facts. Likewise, the National Trans-
portation Safety Board acts after the fact. It investigates and ana-
lyzes accidents and then issues recommendations which, theo-
retically, help avoid similar accidents through information and
operational, design, or regulatory changes. Because such pro-
cedures are tutorial rather than punitive they may be more valu-
able but can't compare with a system that acts before the fact to
prevent accidents. The first-hand type of information generated by
ASRS is invaluable to understanding how hazardous situations
develop. In addition to the quarterly reports and alert bulletins,
there is another very valuable product of ASRS. A pilot, controller,
or other aviation system user acquires an education as he attempts
to explain what happened to the ASRS report analyst. Thinking
about a problem in order to explain it is invaluable to a better
understanding of the role of human error in safety incidents.
The 1979 evaluation concluded that the security measures
guarding the confidentiality of the reports have been virtually in-
violate and that no weakness exists in the procedures or in the
security system elements.' This affirms that the interest in safety
holds a high place in the order of priorities for an effective na-
tional aviation system. The fact ASRS is recognized internationally
for its credibility and effectiveness is also a strong testament to
its value. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery then ASRS
has been complimented generously by nations such as Canada
and Great Britain which have sought the advice of ASRS staff in
establishing or reforming their own national aviation safety report-
ing systems. 77
Not only will ASRS provide information for the aviation com-
176 Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm. (June 29,
1979).
117 Proposed Modification of the Aviation Safety Reporting System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979-1980) (state-
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munity's use but it could quite possibly be a valuable source of
information to attorneys involved in aviation related work. ASRS
could become a source of information regarding safety incident
statistics which could be useful in air crash litigation."8 The possi-
bility that labor attorneys advising clients how to respond to safety
incidents and the consequences of their response could be an-
other element of the usefulness of ASRS products. Likewise, ASRS
output may serve as a valuable tool for FAA staff attorney's in
advising the aviation community on how to give constructive safety
input without fear of punishment for their efforts. In short, in-
creased awareness of ASRS and its possibilities could enhance
both its usefulness and the possibility of a long, productive life.
The future of ASRS will be bright if the recommendation of the
Advisory Subcommittee is followed. "The Aviation Safety Report-
ing System should continue its mission beyond 1980 without sub-
stantial change in its charter and purposes. Nothing should be per-
mitted to inhibit the flow of information necessary for the con-
tinued growth of the ASRS data base during future years."" In
the end analysis the following statement by the Advisory Sub-
committee may very well ring true: "The long and at times heated
contention over the waiver may come to be viewed as one of the
most classic human factor events associated with ASRS."'"8 The
future safety advancements, and life and property-saving results
of the ASRS will, I believe, overshadow all the debate as to its
methods.
1 8 See note 60 supra.
171 Report on ASRS Utility and Effectiveness, Advisory Subcomm. on Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System, NASA Aeronautical Advisory Comm. (June 29,
1979).
180 Id.
1980]

